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Analysing	labels,	associations,	and	sentiments	in	Twitter	
on	the	Abu	Sayyaf	kidnapping	of	Viktor	Okonek	
Abstract		This	 paper	 investigates	 Twitter	 data	 related	 to	 the	 kidnapping	 case	 of	 two	 German	nationals	 in	 the	 southern	 region	 of	 the	 Philippines	 by	 the	 Abu	 Sayyaf	 Group	 (ASG).	 It	explores	 perceptions	 of	 the	 ASG,	 along	 with	 associated	 organizations	 and	 sentiments	indicated	 in	 the	 tweets	 together	 with	 statistically	 significant	 relationships.	 Findings	revealed	 that:	 “Rebel”	 and	 “Militant”	were	 the	most	 frequently	 used	 labels	 for	 the	 ASG;	Majority	 of	 the	 tweets	 contained	 sentiments	 that	 assess	 threats	 such	 as	 abduction	 and	kidnapping	 of	 hostages;	 and	 almost	 half	 contained	 words	 that	 indicate	 negotiation	 or	concession	 to	 the	 demands	 of	 the	 captors.	 Logistic	 regression	 analyses	 on	 "Rebel"	 and	"Islamist"	 revealed	 positive	 coefficients	 for	 these	 sentiments	 used	 as	 predictors.	 This	meant	that	people	who	assessed	threats	and	expressed	sentiments	that	responses	should	concede	to	the	captors’	demands	were	more	likely	to	use	the	“Rebel”	or	“Islamist”	labels.	Rather	 than	 the	 two	 longstanding	 dominant	 narratives	 of	 the	 ASG	 as	 terrorist	 and	criminals,	 the	 emerging	 rebel	 and	 militant	 labels,	 suggest	 a	 more	 domestically	 and	politically	 sensitive	Twitter	 commentarial	 than	 represented	 in	 the	work	of	 the	Al-Qaeda	
centric	 paradigm	 exponents.	 These	 findings	 along	 with	 the	 complex	 associated	 political	and	policy	contexts	and	implications	are	discussed	in	this	paper.		Keywords:	Abu	Sayyaf,	Islamist,	Militant,	Mindanao,	Rebel,	Kidnapping,	Terrorism	
Introduction	According	 to	 the	 popular	 award	 winning	 American	 author/journalist	 Mark	 Bowden,	Mindanao	 and	 the	ASG	are	 very	much	 ‘jihadists	 in	Paradise’1.	 Such	high	profile	 attention	(primarily	 off	 the	 back	 of	 the	 2001	 ‘Dos	 Palmas	 Kidnappings’	 of	 Martin	 and	 Gracia	Burnham	 (and	 others)	 by	 the	 ASG)	has	 lead	 to	 a	 well-established,	 and	 little	 contested,	focus	of	US	foreign	policy	around	‘fighting	them	there,	so	we	don't	have	to	fight	them	here’2.		Diplomatically	the	Philippines	stood	shoulder	to	shoulder3	with	the	US	following	9/11	and	demonstrated	this	by	promising	to	take	on	the	ASG4.	Making	Mindanao	the	poster-boy	for	
the	 second	 front	 thesis5,	 portraying	 it	 as	 the	 go-to	 sanctuary	 in	 the	 region	 for	 the	 jihad.		While	 a	 precious	 minority	 has	 advocated	 caution	 and	 problems,	 a	 “dominant	 model,	
perpetuated	 in	 the	 media	 by	 prominent	 commentators	 Rohan	 Gunaratna	 and	 Zachary	
Abuza”6,	have	established	an	influential	predilection	for	what	Carlyle	Thayer	called	the	“al	
Qaeda-centric	paradigm”7.		
	The	 Abu	 Sayyaf	 Group	 is	 one	 of	 many,	 but	 perhaps	 the	 most	 telling	 of	 enigmas	 in	 the	Muslim	insurgency	in	Mindanao.	Levels	of	understanding	on	who,	what,	and	why	they	are	is	 perhaps	 illustrated	 best	 and	 most	 recently	 through	 social	 media	 -	 where	 such	(mis)understandings	proliferate,	complicate	and	cement.	The	Okonek	kidnapping	offers	us	a	contemporary	case	to	analyse	how	traditional	media	previously	misled	the	public,	often	through	 reliance	 on	 questionable	 academic	 work,	 against	 contemporary	 views	 in	 new	
media8	on	 the	 ASG.	 The	 labels,	 associations,	 and	 sentiments	 directed	 towards	 the	 ASG	elucidate	the	level	and	complexity	of	public	understanding	on	one	of	the	most	contentious	and	important	aspect	of	one	of	the	world’s	longest	running	conflicts.	The	ASG	have	come	
	
to	represent	the	international	terror	dimension	to	what	until	9/11	was	regarded	as	largely	an	indigenous	insurgency.		The	‘popular	representations’9	in	the	media	of	the	ASG	have,	as	Ugarte	has	shown,	come	from	a	reliance	on	official	reports,	resulting	in	propaganda.		This	research	was	undertaken	because	we	“realize	that	claims	have	consequences”10	and	many	claims	 are	 made	 of	 the	 ASG,	 this	 would	 be	 an	 opportune	 moment	 to	 measure	 those	consequences.		
“The	phrase	"al-Qaeda-linked"	has	become	a	permanent,	self-perpetuating	fixture	that	
is	questioned	by	no	one	and	repeated	by	everyone.”11		Supposedly	 the	 region	 is	 “afflicted”12	by	 an	 ideological	menace	 that	 has	 “shifted	 from	the	
middle	east	to	the	Asia-pacific	region”13.	This	 supposed	Talibanzation	of	Southeast	Asia	as	Bilveer	Singh	would	have	us	believe,	has	created	a	widespread	and	entrenched	postulation	that	 the	 jihad	 is	 connected,	 conspiratorially	 organised	 and	 controlled,	 with	 the	 ASG	 the	lethal	 tip	 of	 the	 tentacle.	 Mindanao	 was	 therefore	 said	 to	 be	 ‘the	 next	 Afghanistan’14	because	 of	 the	 ASG.	 The	 prominent	 rationale	 for	 the	 preoccupation	 to	 the	 idea	 that	Southeast	Asia	 and	Mindanao	 in	 particular	 is	 ‘connected’	 is	 through	 a	 process	 known	 as	
radicalisation,	and	the	idea	of	failed	states	becoming	a	‘sanctuary’	or	‘breeding	ground’	for	
the	 jihad15	by	 the	 spread	 of	 radicalization.	 Like	 a	 pathogen	 spread	 top-down	 from	 the	ASG’s	 “charismatic	 leaders”16	Mindanao	 became	 cast	 by	 way	 of	 little	 more	 than	 second	hand	unverifiable	stories:		
“Osama	personally	forged	the	link	with	Abdurajak	Janjalani,	the	founder	and	leader	of	
ASG.	ASG’S	organization,	ideology,	target	selection	and	tactics	are	deeply	influenced	by	
Al	Qaeda…	The	extent	of	the	Al-Qaeda-Philippines	 link	was	such	that	by	 integrating	a	
few	hundred	Moros	from	Mindanao,	in	the	southern	Philippines,	first	to	wage	jihad	and	
thereafter	 to	 secure	 Al	 Qaeda’s	 assistance	 in	 their	 fight	 for	 an	 independent	 Islamic	
state,	it	established	a	special	Moro	sub-brigade	in	Afghanistan.”17		Academic	 understanding	 is	 caught	 between	 Thayers	 “radically	 different	 view”18	and	 the	dangerous	 ‘pathologizing’	 of	 the	 jihad,	 common	 in	 the	 radicalisation	 explanation,	 as	Hamilton-Hart	brilliantly	recognized19.	 	The	armies	of	Overseas	Filipino	Workers	(OFWs)	in	the	Middle	East	and	elsewhere,	who	come	and	go	routinely	are	seemingly	ignored	when	it	comes	to	making	stark	warnings	based	on	the	Afghan	Alumni	who	apparently	“returned	
to	their	homelands	as	well,	 infused	with	a	dangerously	radical	 ‘jihad	mentality’.”20	It	 is	 this	backdrop	 which	 Ugarte	 and	 Turner	 signalled	 out	 to	 describe	 the	 social	 construction	 of	Mindanao:		
“This	 social	 construction	 is	 the	 ‘enacted	 environment’	 (Weick	 1977)…	 we	 ‘actually	
shape	 future	 realities’	 (Morgan	 1989:	 93)	 while	 failing	 to	 appreciate	 that	 our	
perceptions	 could	 be	 based	 on	 the	 ‘fallacy	 of	 misplaced	 concreteness’	 (Whitehead	
1948).	 That	 is,	 unwarranted	 conclusions	are	drawn	about	 the	way	 things	are	 (in	 this	
particular	case,	what	the	‘Abu	Sayyaf’	actually	is).”21		Analysis	of	 the	Okonek	kidnapping	by	 the	ASG	will	 tell	us	how	the	social	media	users	of	Twitter	 commenting	on	 the	 incident	 socially	construct	 the	ASG,	 and	 the	 conflict.	Do	 they	see	the	ASG	as	international	jihadists	linked	to	al	Qaeda22	with	“tentacles”23	everywhere	or	as	O’Brien	noted,	local	‘bandits’24	playing	out	the	conflicts	“agrarian	roots”25?			
	
Academics	have	commendably	exposed	 the	 flaws26	and	 lack	of	evidence27	put	 forward	 to	support	any	connections	the	ASG	and	the	conflict	in	Mindanao	has	to	the	global	jihad.	ASG	is	a	symptom	of	the	wider	“persistent	fixation	on	Islam,	radicalism	and	terrorism	on	part	of	
the	policy	community”28	in	the	region	which	 is	based	on	“anecdotal	‘evidence’”29	that	 lacks	basic	“academic	checkability”30.	And	while	the	academy	trades	scholastic	blows,	prominent	exponents	continue	to	publish	new	material	with	the	ASG	the	go-to	targets	of	Mindanao31	as	 the	 jihads	 breeding	 ground.	 The	 audience	 for	 these	 publications,	 as	 seen	 through	Twitter,	is	likely	to	be	well	acquainted	with	the	media	savvy	‘experts’	of	Jihad	in	Mindanao	and	 their	 labels	 for	 the	 ASG.	 	 Here	 we	 see	 if,	 and	 how,	 the	 al	 Qaeda	 centric	 paradigm	manifests,	 because	we	 are	 starting	 to	 see	 a	 revival	 of	 a	 “false	analogy”32	on	Mindanao	 in	new	 publications,	 some	 from	 the	 same	 prominent	 authors	who	 have	 yet	 to	 address	 the	questions	many	raised	previously.		
Significance	of	the	Study			Focus	 on	 a	 single	 incident	 such	 as	 here	 with	 Okonek	 isolate	 views	 of	 those	 on	 Twitter	against	such	a	backdrop.	This	analysis	therefore	starts	where	others	have	looked	into	this	issue	before,	understanding	 that	attention	needs	 to	be	paid	 “from	the	perspective	of	local	
realities,	not	externally	imposed	organigrams”33,	allowing	us	to	assess	perspectives	used	in	this	 ASG	 incident.	 This	 is	 a	 pressing	 issue	 for	 the	 region	 and	 the	 conflict,	 as	 the	 ASG	represent	 its	 most	 dangerous	 and	 volatile	 quantity	 -	 with	 the	 success	 of	 the	 current	Aquino	 administrations	 attempted	 Bangsamoro	 peace	 deal	 reliant	 on	 ASG	 being	inoculated	 by	 political	 reconciliation	 with	 the	 more	 stable	 and	 overtly	 political	 Moro	Islamic	Liberation	Front	(MILF).	Avoiding	questions	about	the	identity	and	perception	of	the	ASG	will	only	further	many	of	the	current	problems	and	likely	 lead	to	collapse	of	yet	another	attempt	at	peace	in	Mindanao.	Without	research	into	current	understanding,	it	is	difficult	 to	see	how	the	necessary	public	support	can	be	obtained	to	achieve	any	success	for	 new	 legislation	 and	 governance	 in	 Mindanao.	 It	 has	 been	 noted	 previously	 that	avoiding	the	complexities	of	the	ASGs	meaning	has	lead	to	a	self-perpetuating	cycle:		
	“The	Abu	Sayyaf	seems	to	be	whoever	the	military	claims	it	to	be	and	given	those	who	
are	 labelled	 Abu	 Sayyaf,	 being	 buried	 six	 feet	 under,	 could	 no	 longer	 contest	 the	
military’s	claims	of	being	just	that”34.		Understanding	 the	 result	 of	 this	 continued	 pattern	 for	 “convenient	 but	 misleading”35	labelling	will	 renew	 focus	 on	 the	 ASG	 and	 the	 conflict	 in	Mindanao	 against	 the	 current	backdrop	of	peace	negotiations.	Previous	statements	of	how	the	ASG	are	‘perceived’,	such	as	 here	 by	 O’Brien	 have	 not	 been	 well	 sourced,	 probably	 relying	 on	 the	 media	representations	rather	than	perceptions	in	the	populous:			
“Notably,	when	ASG	 is	perceived	throughout	the	Philippines	as	nothing	more	than	an	
armed	kidnapping	gang,	 this	 creates	new	opportunities	 to	gather	 intelligence	 from	a	
population	 less	 tolerant	 of	 their	 purely	 criminal	 behavior…	 Periods	 of	 heightened	
criminal	 activity	 make	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	 a	 group	 like	 ASG	 to	 portray	 itself	 as	
motivated	 by	 a	 ‘‘greater	 good’’—thus,	 law	 enforcement	 and	 security	 agencies	 can	
benefit	 from	 noting	 this	 and	 capitalizing	 on	 a	 group’s	 ideological	 vulnerabilities,	
weakening	 its	 resilience	 to	 a	 point	 where,	 eventually,	 the	 group	 can	 no	 longer	
survive.”36		
	
This	 research	 uses	 Okonek	 and	 Twitter	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 an	 empirical	 foundation	 on	 the	latest’s	 perceptions	 of	 the	 ASG.	With	 an	 evidentiary	 basis,	 this	 research	 disagrees	 with	O’Brien	 and	 tells	 us	 that	 those	 who	 did	 label	 the	 ASG	 in	 the	 Okonek	 tweets	 were	 less	inclined	towards	a	criminal	association.		As	Woodier	 noted	 “reporting	 of	 the	 terror	 threat	 in	 Southeast	 Asia	 is	 often	 unintelligent,	
simplistic,	and	sensational.	It	often	lacks	perspective	and	proportion.	Journalism	on	the	ASG	has	 given	 little	 consideration	 to	 what	 is	 perhaps	 the	 guiding	 question	 on	 terrorism	understanding	 -	 	 “how	do	we	know	this?”37	Creditably	Ugarte	and	Turner	decided	 to	 “test	
claims	that	the	‘Abu	Sayyaf’	has	features	of	organizations	as	conventionally	portrayed	in	the	
organic	metaphor	and	structural	 frame”38,	 finding	 significant	disjuncture	 in	 the	 reporting	of	 ASG	 structure	 compared	 to	what	 could	 be	 independently	 verified.	We	 thus	 ask:	what	narrative	did	the	Twitter	users	on	Okonek	fall	into?	
Background		German	couple	Dr.	Stefan	Viktor	Okonek	and	Henrike	Dielen	spent	almost	seven	months	in	captivity	after	being	seized	from	their	yacht	in	April	2014,	about	10	nautical	miles	off	the	coast	 of	 Rio	 Tuba	 in	 Palawan.	 With	 the	 backdrop	 of	 recent	 video	 decapitations	 of	international	 journalists	 James	 Foley,	 Steven	 Sotloff,	 and	 David	 Haines	 by	 an	 Islamic	extremist	 group	 in	August	 and	September	of	 that	 year,	 the	Abu	Sayyaf	 group	 (ASG)	had	threatened	to	behead	Dr.	Okonek,	even	showing	pictures	of	him	standing	on	his	supposed	grave,	unless	a	ransom	demand	of	P250	million	was	paid,	with	the	deadline	set	on	October	17,	 15:00	 (local	 time).	 After	 a	 brief	 period	 of	 uncertainty	 between	 negotiations	 and	deadline	extensions,	the	ASG	claimed	that	their	ransom	demand	had	been	met,	prompting	the	release	of	Okonek	and	Dielen	on	the	evening	of	October	17	in	Barangay	Sandah,	Patikul,	Sulu39.	During	 the	most	 critical	moments	 in	October,	 in	 addition	 to	 extensive	 traditional	media	 coverage	 such	 as	 local	 television	 and	 radio,	 the	 events	 garnered	 substantial	attention	in	online	news	sources	and	social	media	with	more	international	audiences.		The	 ASG	 has	 had	 a	 reported	 connection40	to	 international	 terror	 since	 9/11.	 Studies	 of	their	 genealogy	 linked	 them	 most	 often	 (but	 not	 exclusively)	 to	 the	 global	 scope	 of	 al	Qaeda	41	or	 the	 more	 regional	 Jemaah	 Islamiya42.	 The	 ASG	 have	 become	 the	 Southeast	Asian	associate,	offspring,	franchise,	affiliate	43,	or	however	it	is	termed,	of	the	jihad	lead	by	“messianic	and	mystic”44	figures.	This	leads	to	“Official	and	media	sources	[that]	continually	
refer	 to	 a	 social	 entity	 known	 as	 the	 ‘Abu	 Sayyaf’”45.	 As	 Docena	 astutely	 noted,	 the	 ASG	became	 one	 of	 the	 foundations	 for	 the	 logic	 behind	 greater	US	military	 attention	 to	 the	region	in	the	war	on	terror:	
	“Speaking	 of	 the	 Abu	 Sayyaf,	 no	 mention	 of	 the	 group	 now	 seems	 to	 be	 complete	
without	the	phrase	"al-Qaeda	linked".	News	report	after	news	report	point	out	that	the	
Abu	Sayyaf	is	linked	to	Osama	bin	Laden's	worldwide	network	and	leave	it	at	that	-	as	
though	such	a	claim	has	been	established	and	is	not	to	be	questioned	any	longer.”46			Occasionally,	 this	 already	 murky	 portrayal	 is	 muddied	 further	 with	 the	 complexities	 of	involvement	 with	 ‘networked’	 crime47 .	 As	 a	 result	 “the	 label	 ‘Abu	 Sayyaf’	 gradually	
underwent	a	process	of	inflation”48	into	terrorism49.	It	 is	unclear	whether	or	not	this	story	of	transition	or	inflation	to	terror	is	accurate,	but	nevertheless	it	is	well	reported	that	the	ASG	sits	at	the	nexus	50	of	crime	and	terror.			
	
Objectives	of	the	Study	This	 paper	 investigates	 Twitter	 data	 related	 to	 the	 Viktor	 Okonek	 and	 Henrike	 Dieter	kidnapping	 by	 the	 ASG.	 It	 will	 determine	 perceptions	 of	 the	 ASG	 and	 associated	organizations	 along	 with	 sentiments	 indicated	 in	 the	 tweets	 and	 explore	 statistically	significant	 relationships.	 The	 analysis	 specifically	 addresses	 the	 following	 research	questions:		1)	What	labels	were	used	in	the	tweets	to	describe	the	Abu	Sayyaf	group?		2)	What	organizations	that	may	be	associated	with	the	ASG	were	mentioned	in	the	tweets?	3)	What	were	the	sentiments	found	in	the	tweets?	4)	How	are	these	variables	related	to	each	other	and	how	are	the	labels	used	to	describe	the	ASG	predicted	by	these	other	variables?		Finally,	 the	 study	 also	 aims	 towards	 an	 understanding	 of	 perceptions	 and	 framing	 of	terrorist	and	criminal	organizations	such	as	the	ASG	within	the	Mindanao	context	and	its	implications.	 Crucially	 this	 will	 be	 the	 first	 attempt	 to	 find	 and	 test	 any	 popular	appreciation	of	the	al	Qaeda	centric	paradigm.	 
Data	and	Methods	Twitter	 data	 was	 collected	 via	 the	 Search	 API	 (application	 programming	 interface51 ) during	the	most	critical	days	of	the	Viktor	Okonek	and	Henrike	Dieter	kidnapping	by	the	Abu	Sayyaf	Group.	The	data	collection	methods	adopted	for	this	paper	are	similar	to	those	used	by	Burnap	et	al.52	and	Cheong	and	Lee53	in	order	to	determine	keywords	for	queries,	tweet	gathering	procedures,	and	utilization	of	other	online	facilities	such	as	Google	Trends.	Data	suggests	an	issue	attention	cycle	of	about	17	days	when	public	attention	and	Twitter	activity	 related	 to	 the	 event	was	most	 frequent.	 The	 sampling	 time	 frame	 for	 this	 study	was	the	period	of	October	9th	to	25th	of	2014	from	which	we	collected	N=	9026	tweets.		The	sample	was	subjected	to	pre-processing	and	recoding	prior	to	modelling,	as	described	below.	 Collection	 was	 performed	 using	 JAVA	 code	 ran	 in	 NetBeans	 IDE	 to	 access	 and	retrieve	 Twitter	 data	 automatically,	 and	 converted	 into	 CSV	 format.	NVIVO,	 a	 Computer	Assisted	Qualitative	Data	Analysis	 Software	 (CAQDAS)	was	utilized	 for	 initial	 analysis	of	text	contents	via	word	frequencies,	distribution,	and	clustering.	Spreadsheet	software	was	then	 used	 for	 coding,	 recoding,	 data	 checking,	 and	 creation	 of	 additional	 variables	 for	further	analysis	based	on	initial	findings	from	CAQDAS.			Upon	 creation	 of	 a	 consolidated	 dataset	 from	 the	 Twitter	 data	 sample,	 descriptive	statistics	 and	 various	 statistical	 methods	 such	 as	 chi-square,	 bivariate	 correlation	(Spearman’s	 rho)	 were	 performed.	 	 All	 English	 tweets	 were	 then	 filtered	 (N=3524)	 for	further	 analyses	 such	 as	 binary	 logistic	 regression	 with	 the	 aid	 of	 statistical	 analysis	software.	Collected	data	that	were	used	in	the	analysis	includes:	Tweet	details	such	as	date	creation,	 language,	 ID,	 text;	 Twitter	 user	 details	 such	 as	 name,	 location,	 description,	account	 creation	 date,	 followers	 count,	 friends	 count,	 status	 count,	 etc.;	 Additional	 data	were	also	obtained	from	sources	such	as	IMF	and	World	Bank,	based	on	country	location	information	 for	 preliminary	 analyses	 such	 as	 bivariate	 correlations,	 though	 are	 not	included	 in	 the	 regression	 models	 due	 to	 incomplete	 or	 unavailable	 user	 details	 that	would	result	in	a	substantial	decrease	of	samples	size.			
	
Variables	extensively	used	 in	the	analysis	are	based	on	most	 frequently	occurring	words	determined	using	CAQDAS	and	keywords	and	categories	in	sentiment	analysis	utilized	in	previous	 literature	 on	 terrorism54	or	 on	 event	 focused	 case	 studies55.	 On	 the	 basis	 that	“classifying	emotional	 content	 from	 informational	 content	 remains	an	 important	challenge	
in	social	media	analysis”56,	attempts	at	scaling	sentiment	become	particularly	salient	when	applied	 on	 a	 high	 publicity	 event	 such	 as	 this.	 Also	 when	 they	 involve	 a	 vaguely	 (and	contested)	 criminal,	 terrorist,	 and	 extremist	 group,	 with	 rescue	 efforts	 coordinated	 by	multiple	 agencies	 and	 countries,	 with	 outcomes	 affecting	 public	 perceptions.	 It	 must	however	 be	 noted	 that	 aside	 from	previously	 utilized	 approaches	 to	 sentiment	 analysis,	analysts	 may	 still	 employ	 various	 critical	 and	 qualitative	 methods	 to	 understand	 tweet	content	and	individual	perspectives.	Categories	may	also	be	customized	in	order	to	adjust	to	particular	cultures	or	events	that	transpire.		The	 group	 labels	 and	organization	 connection	 variables	 used	 are	 based	on	 the	 study	by	Ugarte	and	Turner57	as	well	as	the	most	frequent	descriptions	of	the	ASG	from	online	news	articles	 related	 to	 the	 kidnapping.	 Possible	 label	 variables	 included:	 bandit,	 criminal,	extremist,	fighter,	Islamist,	jihadist,	kidnapper,	militant,	muslim/moslem,	rebel,	separatist,	and	terrorist.			Logistic	regressions	were	applied	to	explain	occurrence	of	the	three	most	frequently	used	labels	 in	 tweets	 for	 the	 ASG,	 with	 variables	 such	 as	 sentiment	 categories,	 associated	organizations,	 and	 if	 indicated	 location.	 The	 outcome	 variables:	 "Rebel",	 "Militant",	 and	"Islamist"	were	 coded	 1	 if	 it	 is	mentioned	 in	 the	 tweet	 and	 0	 otherwise.	 The	 predictors	were:	 Sentiment	 categories	 -	 Assessments	 of	 Threats,	 Response	 conceding	 to	 the	 ASG	demands,	Emotions	of	Fear	or	Anxiety,	Response	and	Law	Enforcement,	and	Assessments	of	Casualties;	Mentioned	Associations	-	Islamic	State	(ISIS),	Moro	Islamic	Liberation	Front	(MILF),	 al	 Qaeda;	 and	 if	 location	 indicated	 is	 the	 Philippines.	 Data	 encoding,	 pre-processing,	treatment	and	modelling,	were	conducted	following	statistical	procedures	for	binary	logistic	regression58.		
Analysis	and	Results  From	the	9,026	tweets	related	to	the	ASG	kidnapping,	four	out	of	five	users	with	the	most	tweets	were	located	in	the	Philippines	(Refer	to	table	1).	User	descriptions	indicated	that	these	four	users	were	news	organizations/companies.	Despite	only	being	the	third	highest	number	 of	 tweets,	 the	most	 prominent	 among	 the	 top	 five	 is	 “DZBB	 Super	Radyo”	with	38,124	 followers,	 Super	 Radyo	DZBB	 594	 kHz	 is	 the	 flagship	 AM	 radio	 station	 of	 Radio	GMA	 Network	 Inc.	 in	 the	 Philippines	 –	 a	 subsidiary	 of	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 broadcasting	networks	in	the	country	and	one	of	the	top	AM	stations	in	Metro	Manila.		Interestingly,	55	Tagalog	 tweets	 from	 DZBB	 Super	 Radyo	 focused	 on	 beheading	 (pagpugot),	 ransom,	government	offensive	and	rescue	efforts,	with	more	mention	on	the	Armed	Forces	of	the	Philippines	 (AFP)	 and	military	 related	matters.	 Similarly,	 all	 of	 their	 five	 English	 tweets	suggested	means	to	counter	ASG	and	to	support	government	actions.	Among	the	top	five	users,	 only	 “James	 Greid”	 from	Canada	was	 an	 individual	 user	with	 40	 tweets,	with	 the	other	three	being	primarily	online	news	organizations.		When	considering	only	English	tweets,	all	of	the	top	five	users	were	from	the	Philippines.	The	aforementioned	three:	“PINOY	NEWS	PORTAL”,	“PHILIPPINE	NEWS”,	and	“PHL	News	Online”	were	still	included	in	the	top	5	users.	However	this	time,	the	most	prominent	was	“Rappler”	with	 518837	 followers,	 Rappler	 is	 a	 comparatively	 recent	 news	 organization,	based	 in	 the	 Philippines,	 known	 for	 pioneering	 new	 forms	 of	 internet	 based	 ‘multi-
	
platform	storytelling’,	with	services	available	on	desktop	and	mobile	browsers.	Somewhat	similar	 to	 DZBB,	 the	 English	 tweets	 posted	 by	 Rappler	 mostly	 highlighted	 hostages,	deadline,	and	government	reactions.	The	beheading	aspect	was	also	mentioned	but	not	as	frequent.	Maria	Ressa	(alongside	Gunaratna	and	Abuza)	is	the	queen	of	the	media	darlings	
of	Jihad	in	Mindanao,	as	noted	above,	founded	Rappler59.	Her	work,	which	has	confusingly	straddled	 journalism	and	academia,	unashamedly	claims	special	and	privileged	access	 to	classified	 materials,	 which	 she	 does	 not	 disclose.	 And	 though	 her	 work	 and	 has	 been	regularly	 and	 extensively	 criticised,60	her	 recent	 work	 -	 a	 “powerful	 narrative	 that	 glues	
together	social	networks	–	both	physical	and	virtual	–	which	spread	the	jihadi	virus	form	bin	
Laden	to	Facebook”61	is	a	pseudo-academic	study	of	an	event.	Probably	best	illustrated	in	the	8	pages	that	list	the	“Cast	of	Characters”	and	12	pages	of	hard	to	understand	network	maps,	which	are	only	very	briefly	explained,	though	not	methodologically.	Where	this	data	came	from	is	anyone’s	guess.	The	various	nodes	on	the	‘sociograms’	look	complicated	and	presumably	 are	 there	 to	 give	 the	 book	 some	 academic	 heft	 so	 that	 ‘the	 network’	connection	is	irrefutable,	with	such	complicated	diagrams	to	prove	it.			Ressa	is	at	the	centre	of	this	issue,	she	owns	a	social	media	company	to	disseminate	the	al	
Qaeda	centric	paradigm.	 She	does	 this	by	pointing	vaguely	 to	evils	 found	 in	social	media	and	unscientifically	makes	associative	claims	such	as	Filipinos	(or	Filipino	organizations,	the	ASG	included)	being	interconnected	to	the	global	terrorist	scourge:				
“Filipinos	connect	with	al-Qaeda-linked	groups	 in	Somalia	and	Yemen.	The	black	flag-	
embedded	 in	al-Qaeda	 lore	–	pops	up	on	websites	and	Facebook	pages	 from	around	
the	world,	including	the	Philippines,	Indonesia,	the	Middle	East,	Afghanistan,	Australia	
and	North	Africa.”62		
		It	 must	 be	 noted	 that	 although	 Ressa	 has	 not	 collected	 substantial	 amounts	 of	 data	 or	applied	Burnap	et	al’s	or	Cheong	and	Lee’s	methods.	After	seeing	some	dastardly	looking	Facebook	 pages,	 she	 has	 used	 them	 to	 artificially	 modernise	 the	 connections	 between	Mindanao	 and	 the	 jihad.	 As	 such,	 there	 is	 no	 justification	 as	 to	 why	 the	 few	 al	 Qaeda	decorated	Facebook	pages	may	be	more	 significant	 than	 the	many	more	with	memes	of	cats	playing	the	piano	or	dogs	on	surfboards.				Among	users	who	specified	their	locations,	the	top	five	countries	with	the	most	number	of	tweets	 were:	 The	 Philippines,	 Indonesia,	 Germany,	 Malaysia,	 and	 USA.	 These	 possibly	relate	 to	 the	 geographic	 distance,	 number	 of	 Filipinos	 living	 in	 the	 country,	 and	 the	involvement	 of	 the	 country	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 Germany)	 to	 the	 kidnapping.	 As	 for	 English	tweets	that	comprised	39.04%	of	the	sample,	the	most	numerous	came	from:	Philippines,	Malaysia,	Nigeria,	Bahrain,	and	UK.	There	were	only	59	(1.67%)	English	tweets	that	came	from	Germany. 
Labels	 for	 the	 Abu	 Sayyaf	 Group,	 other	 organizations	 mentioned,	 and	
sentiments	in	tweets	Rebels	 and	 Militants	 were	 the	 most	 frequently	 used	 labels	 (15.75%	 and	 14.10%	respectively)	for	the	Abu	Sayyaf	in	English	tweets.	Only	3.38%	of	the	tweets	label	them	as	Islamists.	Other	labels	appear	less	than	1%	among	the	tweets	(Refer	to	Table	2).			For	the	"Rebel"	label,	looking	at	the	strongest	correlations	that	these	two	labels	have	with	other	 variables:	 the	 use	 of	 the	 label	 "rebel"	 was	 found	 to	 have	 positive	 significant	correlations	with	sentiments	related	to	threat	assessment	(.311,	p<0.001)	and	responses	
	
conceding	 to	 the	 ASG	 demands	 (.404,	 p<0.001),	 along	 with	 the	 distance	 of	 the	 tweet	location	country	from	Jolo	(.276,	p<0.001),	GDP	per	capita	of	the	country	(.248,	p<0.001)	and	if	the	country	is	predominantly	Muslim	(.366,<0.001).			On	the	other	hand,	the	"militant"	label	was	found	to	have	a	strong	positive	correlation	with	the	"Islamist"	 label	(.407,	p<0.001)	along	with	the	distance	of	the	tweet	 location	country	from	Jolo	 (.308,	p<0.001),	and	had	a	negative	correlation	with	sentiments	related	 to	 law	enforcement	(-.155,	p<0.001).				Only	 1.42%	of	 the	English	 tweets	mentioned	 ISIS,	while	 organizations	 such	 as	 the	MILF	and	Al	Qaeda	were	mentioned	 less	 than	1%	of	 the	 time.	Less	 than	a	handful	 tweets	had	mentioned	the	MNLF	or	the	Jemaah	Islamiyah.		Majority	(61.21%)	of	the	tweets	in	English	contained	sentiments	that	assess	threats	such	as	abduction	and	kidnapping	of	hostages.	About	half	(43.44%)	contained	words	pertaining	to	 responses	 such	 as	 payment	 of	 ransom,	 that	 indicate	 negotiation	 or	 concession	 to	 the	demands	of	the	captors.		Less	than	a	quarter	of	the	tweets	contained	the	more	evocative	of	categories	such	as	fear	anxiety	(20.66%)	and	pessimistic	scenarios	of	casualty	assessment	(14.22%).	It	 is	then	worth	mentioning	that	although	the	top	Twitter	users	with	the	most	followers	such	as	DZBB	and	Rappler,	references	to	government	response,	the	category	of	Response	and	Law	Enforcement	sentiment,	was	found	to	be	only	in	16.69%	of	the	tweets. 
Correlations	of	sentiment	category	variables		Utilizing	similar	variable	categories	employed	in	sentiment	analysis	by	other	researchers	on	 civilian	 sentiment	 and	 response	 to	 terrorism	events	 via	Twitter,	 results	 of	 this	 study	indicate	 that	 sentiments	 that	 contain	 assessments	 of	 threats	 had	 positive	 significant	correlations	with	 the	 sentiments	 of	 responses	 pertaining	 to	 negotiating	 or	 conceding	 to	ASG	demands	(.256,	p<0.001),	while	negatively	correlated	with	responses	mentioning	law	enforcement	 and	 government	 action	 (-.272,	 p<0.001).	 As	 mentioned	 previously,	 it	 was	found	 to	 be	 positively	 correlated	with	 the	 label	 of	 "rebel".	Whether	 the	 tweet	was	 from	Germany	was	 found	 not	 to	 be	 significantly	 correlated	 to	 the	 sentiment,	 but	 it	 was	 also	found	 that	 the	distance	(in	 terms	of	kilometers)	of	 Jolo	 to	 the	 tweet	source	 location	was	positively	correlated	(.278,	p<0.001),	that	is	to	say	-	the	farther	the	distance,	the	more	of	such	sentiments	were	observed.		
 The	 conceding	 responses	 category	was	 found	 to	 be	 negatively	 correlated	 to	 sentiments	containing	 assessments	 of	 casualties	 (-.211,	 p<0.001),	while	 positively	 correlated	 to	 the	"rebel"	label	(.404,p<0.001).		Sentiments	 that	 contain	 emotions	 of	 fear	 and	 anxiety	 were	 found	 to	 be	 significantly	correlated	with	assessments	of	casualties	(.597,	p<0.001)	as	words	that	evoke	worrisome	and	 fearful	 emotions	 are	 usually	 accompanied	 by	 words	 detailing	 consequences	 to	 the	victims.			Interestingly,	 sentiments	 that	 mentioned	 responses	 of	 law	 enforcement	 had	 a	 positive	correlation	 if	 the	 tweets	 came	 from	 the	 Philippines	 (.229,	 p<0.001).	 While	 a	 negative	correlation	with	distance	of	Jolo	to	the	tweet	source	location	(-.282,	p<0.001),	that	is	to	say	-	the	farther	the	distance,	the	less	responses	of	law	enforcement	were	observed.			Sentiments	that	contain	assessments	of	casualties	had	a	negative	correlation	with	the	label	of	"militant"(.130,	p<0.001).	
	
	Overall,	 it	was	also	observed	 for	 the	preliminary	analysis	 that	 the	GDP	per	Capita	of	 the	country	were	the	tweet	was	located	had	positive	correlations	with	the	threat	assessment,	conceding	 responses,	 fearful	 emotion,	 casualty	 assessment	 sentiments,	 while	 a	 negative	correlation	with	 law	enforcement	responses.	 	 	Further,	 it	was	also	found	that	distance	of	the	 country	 were	 the	 tweet	 was	 located	 had	 positive	 correlations	 with	 the	 threat	assessment,	 conceding	 responses,	 casualty	 assessment	 sentiments,	 while	 also	 having	 a	negative	correlation	with	law	enforcement	responses. 
Significant	Predictors	of	Labels		For	 the	 binary	 logistic	 regression	 analyses,	 results	 show	 that	 sentiments	 that	 contain	'assessment	 of	 threats'	 and	 'responses	 that	 concede	 to	 the	 kidnappers'	 demands'	significantly	 predicted	 usage	 of	 "Rebel",	 "Militant",	 and	 "Islamist"	 labels	 for	 the	 ASG.	Analyses	 on	 "Rebel"	 and	 "Islamist"	 revealed	 positive	 coefficients	 for	 these	 predictors,	whereas	"Militant"	had	a	negative	coefficient.	As	shown	in	Table	3,	exp(b)	values	indicate	that	when	the	sentiments	increase	the	more	likely	that	the	two	labels	are	used,	while	it	is	the	 inverse	 for	 militant.	 Test	 of	 the	 full	 model	 against	 a	 constant	 only	 model	 was	statistically	significant,	indicating	that	the	predictors	as	a	set	reliably	distinguished	usage	of	 labels	 for	 the	 ASG.	 The	 model	 explained	 a	 significant	 proportion	 of	 variance	 on	 the	usage	of	 the	 labels,	 particularly	 for	 "Rebel"	 (Nagelkerke	R²	=	 .45).	 Significant	 associated	organizations	 predictors	 was	 the	 MILF	 for	 the	 "Islamist"	 label.	 While	 for	 the	 "Militant"	label,	the	ISIS	association	predictor	had	a	negative	coefficient.		These	 findings	 may	 also	 be	 interpreted	 as	 usage	 of	 the	 two	 labels	 evoking	 associated	sentiments	of	 threats	and	necessary	responses	 taken	more	seriously.	Or	as	congruent	 to	the	 Rebel	 or	 Islamist	 perceived	 identity.	 Curiously,	 though	 the	 significant	 predictor	 of	location	specified	being	the	Philippines	seem	to	suggest	that	these	labels	are	less	likely	to	be	used	if	the	tweet	location	is	specified	as	originated	from	the	country. 
Discussion		
What	labels	were	used	in	the	tweets	to	describe	the	Abu	Sayyaf	group?	What	
are	the	most	frequent	labels	used	in	English	tweets?		The	two	most	common	labels	used	(see	table	2a)	denote	a	distinct	political	element	to	the	ASG	–	 ‘rebel’	 and	 ‘militant’.	 	 Kidnapping	 is	 not	uncommon	 in	 the	Philippines63	and	often	the	 more	 common	 label	 associated	 in	 kidnappings	 centres	 on	 the	 criminality	 –	 usually	‘bandit’	 or	 ‘criminal’.	 	 As	 O’Brien	 noted,	 the	 “intersection”64	of	 crime	 and	 terror	 adds	 a	further	level	of	complexity	to	the	ASG.	As	such	the	research	seems	to	show	how	the	ASG	in	the	Okonek	case	have	had	their	status	 ‘upgraded’	as	 it	were	from	mere	banditry	to	some	element	 of	 political	 labelling.	 The	 ASG	 are	 an	 enemy	 of	 Filipino	 state	 forces	 and	 it	 is	unlikely	that	on	any	issue	they	would	be	labelled	as	anything	other	than	a	term	denoting	them	as	insurgents	of	the	state.		The	second	group	of	terms,	which	would	demonstrate	some	recital	of	the	Al	Qaeda	centric	
paradigm,	are	Islamist,	Muslim,	and	Jihadist,	with	the	three	being	minority	labels.	Even	on	an	issue	of	international	concern,	the	kidnapping	for	ransom	of	foreign	nationals,	Twitter	commenters	 who	 chose	 to	 label	 the	 ASG,	 interpreted	 the	 ASG	 as	 local	 insurgents.	 The	public	 is	 used	 to	 seeing	ASG	 as	 an	 enemy	 of	 the	 Filipino	 state	 needing	 state	 sanctioned	
	
military	 countenance	 and	 the	 labels	 suggest	 this	 is	 understanding	 behind	 the	 primarily	label	 for	 the	ASG	 in	 this	 case.	The	evidence	of	 this	 is	 likely	 to	be	well	 received	 in	policy	circles	in	Manila	advocating	for	continued	military	operations	in	the	region.	If	the	general	public	 is	 of	 a	 similar	 mind	 to	 the	 Twitter	 users	 on	 the	 Okonek	 case,	 it	 suggests	 that	 a		cemented	view	of	the	ASG	as	an	internal	struggle	for	political	power	in	Mindanao.	This	is	despite	the	overtly	wild	claims	of	internationally	fuelled	and	facilitated	terrorism	by	Ressa,	Abuza	and	Gunaratna.		 	This	 finding	 lends	 support	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 complexities	 of	 Filipino	 politics,	identity	 and	 citizenship,	 reflected	 in	 very	 21st	 century	 expressions	 on	 the	 conflict.	 The	complex	 physical	 and	 human	 geography	 of	 the	 nation	 and	 Mindanao	 itself	 mean	 the	diverse	ethno–cultural	heritage	of	the	conflict	remain	pertinent	issues.	Here	the	evidence	suggests	 they	 are	 more	 pertinent,	 rather	 than	 Mindanao	 and	 the	 ASG	 serving	 as	 a	sanctuary	 for	 jihadists.	 	 These	 findings	 reinforce	 the	 recommendation	 that	 further	research	 is	 needed	 on	 “emotional	geography”65	as	Woon	 terms	 it	 to	 further	 examine	 the	seemingly	realized	fragmented	sense	of	nationhood,	identity	and	reality	at	play.	As	Woon	noted	 from	 fieldwork	 in	 the	 region	 “it	 is	 through	 this	 process	 that	 more	 expansive	 and	
nuanced	 knowledges	 of	 violence	 and	 terror	 can	 be	 generated,	 thereby	 invalidating	
secondary,	 discursive	analyses	 of	 these	 events	 as	 the	 sole	 dominant	 reflection	of	 reality,”66.	The	 secondary	 discursive	 labels	 of	 the	al	Qaeda	centric	paradigm	 on	 the	ASG	have	 been	detailed	and	nuanced	and	as	we	see	next,	invalidated	by	social	media	fieldwork	67.		This	research	allowed	us	to	ask	if	the	ASG	were	seen	as	pirates	in	paradise68	or	jihadists	in	
paradise?	And	the	answer	was	neither,	these	two	longstanding	narratives	of	the	ASG	were	not	 found	 significantly	 and	 the	 emerging	 Rebel	 and	Militant	 labels	 may	 surprise	 close	observers	of	 commentary	on	 the	ASG.	 	This	 suggests	a	more	domestically	and	politically	sensitive	 Twitter	 commentarial	 than	 represented	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Al-Qaeda	 centric	
paradigm	exponents.		While	64.39%	(2269)	of	the	English	tweets	had	no	label	for	the	ASG,	the	fact	that	35.61%	(1255)	of	the	tweets	did	seek	to	label	the	ASG	does	demonstrate	an	ASG	labelling	issue	in	a	third	 of	 tweets.	 The	 relative	 conformity	 in	 those	 tweets	 to	 label	 ASG	 in	 political	 terms	should	 not	 be	 regarded	 as	 representative	 on	 its	 own	 though.	 Labels	 are	 of	 course	difficult69;	 hence	 this	 research.	 Given	 the	 nature	 of	 commentary	 on	 the	 ASG	 the	 next	marker	is	often	organizational.	
What	organizations	that	may	be	associated	with	the	ASG	were	mentioned	in	
the	tweets?	 	 		As	a	marker	of	ASG’s	connections,	the	tweets	on	the	Okonek	incident	showed	only	2.58%	(91)	of	English	tweets	added	an	organization	to	the	ASG.	Perhaps,	the	ASG	is	understood	as	 an	organization	 in	 its	own	 right,	 and	 that	 the	need	 to	 ‘link’	 to	other	 entities	 is	 only	 a	minor	concern.		Where	an	organization	(and	we	use	this	term	loosely,	with	the	term	group	already	taken	by	the	ASG	name	itself)	is	mentioned	in	the	same	tweet,	the	currency	of	ISIS	as	 the	 ‘latest’,	 most	 publicized	 organization	 at	 the	 time,	 appears	 to	 supplant	 the	 longer	term	regional	 Jemaah	Islamiyah,	50	tweets	against	 just	2.	 	Links	to	organizations	are	not	prevalent	 and	 the	 tiny	 minority	 of	 tweets	 that	 did	 link	 the	 ASG	 looked	 to	 the	 most	newsworthy	–	ISIS,	despite	it	being	the	most	remote.		
	
Contrast	 the	 2%	 figure	 of	 organisation	 ‘linkages’	 with	 the	 scope	 of	 ‘expert’	 academic	attention	placed	on	linkage	and	we	have	empiricied	a	significant	disjuncture.	As	Fealy	and	Thayer	noted	“international	and	regional	terrorism	specialists	often	use	‘linkage’	in	such	an	
ill-defined	 and	 indiscriminate	 way	 that	 lacks	 analytical	 acuity	 and	 explanatory	 power”70.	Twitter	users	motives	cannot	be	read	from	this	data	but	it	appears	as	if	Colliers	warning	against	 “assuming	 a	world	 of	 clearly	 bounded	 organizations”71	is	 not	 needed	 for	 Twitter	users	 who	 may	 understand	 the	 complexities	 and	 informality	 of	 social	 groupings	 well.	Rather,	the	advice	remains	pertinent	to	those	for	whom	the	issue	of	organisational	linkage	remains	a	primary	concern	-	particularly	amongst	some	journalists	and	academics.	
What	were	the	sentiments	found	in	the	tweets?	 		Over	the	course	of	the	events,	the	majority	of	the	sentiments	found	in	the	tweets	assessed	the	physical	threats	to	the	victims	(61.21%),	expressed	concession	towards	the	demands	of	 the	 captors	 (43.44%),	 and	 conveyed	 anxiety	 and	 fear	 (20.66%).	 Interestingly,	 though	some	(14.22%)	had	sentiments	describing	casualties	and	even	a	few	(1.42%)	who	foresaw	slightly	optimistic	views	that	the	victims	may	escape,	almost	nobody	had	expressed	shock	in	 their	 tweets.	 This	 may	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 rampant	 occurrences	 of	 kidnapping	 that	plague	the	country,	particularly	in	rural	areas.	Such	sentiments	suggest	that	it	has	become	an	unfortunate	 part	 of	 life	 and	 a	 lucrative	 endeavour	 for	 lawless	 elements	 to	 engage	 in.	And	that	the	relatively	rational	course	of	action	is	to	concede	to	the	kidnappers	demands	rather	 than	 risk	 harm,	 particularly	 when	 dealing	 with	 those	 considered	 as	 rebels	 that	appear	to	be	beyond	the	state	and	its	societal	norms.		The	“tremendous	growth”72	in	the	study	of	terrorism	through	novel	and	potentially	useful	methodologies	 such	as	 informatics73	present	a	 renewed	chance	 to	bamboozle	 the	public.	By	focusing	on	social	network	analysis74	on	groups	such	as	ASG,	or	terrorism	more	broadly	the	 danger	 again	 is	 that	 it	 may	 mislead	 the	 public.	 Studies	 that	 have	 looked	 into	 the	Twitter	activity	of	those	afflicted	by	conflict	(such	as	 in	the	Mexican	Drug	War75)	suggest	uses	beyond	immediate	crisis76.	Information	sharing	and	the	ecosystem	of	commentary	is	far	 less	 risky	and	 less	bounded	by	proximity	 to	 the	events.	Commenting	on	 the	ASG	and	Okonek	we	have	seen	that	 the	user	generated	channel77	differs	 from	the	academic,	media	and	policy	channels.		
Conclusions	As	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 have	 revealed,	 depictions	 of	 the	 ASG	 as	 a	 terrorist	organization	 has	 not	 stuck.	 That	 they	 are	 perceived	 as	 primarily	 rebels,	 militants,	 or	Islamists,	by	those	who	chose	to	label	them,	despite	the	milieu	of	atrocities	carried	out	by	other	 extremists	 clearly	 visible	 online,	 is	 an	 important	 insight.	 With	 the	 group	 itself	threatening	to	mimic	the	execution	of	their	captives	unless	their	demands	were	met,	this	ISIS,	al	Qaeda	mimicry	did	not	lead	to	labelling	and	association	compatible	to	the	al	Qaeda	
centric	paradigm.	 However,	 the	 findings	 also	 indicated	 that	 tweets	 from	 the	 Philippines	were	less	likely	to	use	these	labels.	That	may	imply	that	either	the	locals	do	not	classify	the	ASG	with	these	labels	or	that	an	international	audience	chooses	to	brand	the	ASG	as	such	in	 another	 way.	 In	 either	 case,	 the	 ASG	 has	 not	 been	 significantly	 perceived	 as	international	terrorists.	 	As	Michael	Stohl	has	eloquently	argued	in	his	critical	analysis	of	knowledge	 claims	 and	 terrorism;	 “the	audience	 is	not	persuaded”78	even	when	 presented	with	 an	 overwhelming	 diet	 of	 claims	 on	 new	 terror	 networks.	 	 Additional	 future	introspection	 should	 be	 done	 to	 determine	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 state,	 media,	 or	
	
propagandists	 had	 failed	 to	 persuade	 the	 netizens	 of	 the	 ASG	 being;	 terrorists	 doing	criminal	acts,	criminals	engaging	in	terrorist	acts,	or	simply	opportunists	wanting	to	make	a	quick	buck.		The	 repeated	 reports	 that	 Mindanao	 threatens	 to	 be	 ‘the	 next	 Afghanistan’	 which	 are	
echoed	 in	 the	 social	 media	 posts	 of	 organisations	 like	 Rappler	 are	 not	 replicated	 by	individual	Twitter	users.	On	this	topic	we	can	see	that	Twitter	is	not	an	echo	chamber79	for	
the	 al	 Qaeda	 centric	 paradigm.	 This	 is	 despite	 ‘Afghanistan	 cautioning’	 becoming	 well	cemented	 in	 Filipino	 domestic	 policy	 towards	 Mindanao,	 and	 outside	 in	 the	 regional	
second	 front	 informed	 policies	 explicit	 in	 many	 diplomatic	 relations.	 Arguably	 such	cautioning	 was	 at	 its	 peak	 in	 2005,	 but	 repeated	 in	 200980	and	 then	 affirmed	 in	 2011,	following	 the	 Wikileaks	 diplomatic	 cable	 release	 in	 201081	when	 various	 press	 stories	circulated	that	were	both	embarrassing82	for	US-Filipino	relations	and	provide	some	rare	detailed	 evidence	 of	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 US	 was	 providing	 tactical	 and	 intelligence	support83.	This	 situation	however	did	not	 come	 to	pass	overnight,	but	 rather	because	of	the	 protracted	 nature	 of	 the	 conflict	 and	 the	 history	 of	 rebellion,	 insurgency	 and	 anti-colonialism	 in	Mindanao,	 the	 region	 has	 always	 been,	 and	 continues	 to	 be	 opportunely	deemed	as	a	hotbed	for	insurgency.			The	 Philippines	 has	 been	 described	 as	 an	 obvious	 hideout	 and	 sanctuary	 for	 the	global	
jihad.	A	‘host’	country,	carrier	of	the	radicalisation	infection	where	“the	essential	dilemma	
is	 the	 same.	How	does	 one	 separate	 the	 terrorist	 parasite	 from	 its	 unwilling	 host,	without	
doing	fatal	violence	to	the	patient?”84.	This	rather	oblique	view	is	not	just	simplified	to	the	point	of	redundancy	but	is	also	not	represented	in	the	data	collected	here.	The	labels	Rebel	and	Militant	do	not	infer	the	pathology	of	a	radicalised	ideology	and	so	public	support	for	campaigns	will	need	to	address	the	understanding	behind	this	disparity.				With	little	by	the	way	of	verifiable	empirical	study	on	the	reality	of	the	ASG,	dependence	on	 secondary,	 over	 field-work	 based	 primary	 research	 has	 furthered	 the	 drought	 of	country	 specialists.	 “Self-styled	 terrorologists	and	parachute	 journalists”85	have	 attempted	to	set	the	narrative	and	political	agenda.		There	continues	to	be	a	“a	critical	gap	which	has	
emerged	 because	 of	 standard	 interpretations	 have	 tended	 to	 follow	 officially	 approved	
direction	of	a	myriad	self-referencing	military	studies”86	with	many	authors	owing	all	 their	‘research’	and	basing	their	conclusions	from,	the	word	of	the	Philippine	Military	and	other	state	officials.	In	short,	much	of	what	has	been	written	about	the	jihad	and	Mindanao	has	been	framed	in	specific	US	security	terms	87.	Despite	this,	the	Twitter	users	on	the	Okonek	case	appear	to	be	immune,	and	perhaps	know	better	than	to	swallow	a	poorly	argued	and	evidenced	line	by	those	who	often	fail	to	even	spend	time	in	their	country.		Although	 the	 conflict	 in	 Mindanao	 is	 essentially	 local,	 the	 supposed	 “international	
dimension	 as	 the	 separatists	 established	 links	 with	 Islamic	 radicals	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	
Muslim	world”88,	were	 not	 evidenced	 in	 the	 data.	 Only	 3.38%	 of	 English	 tweets	 labelled	them	as	 Islamists,	 and	only	2.58%	 linked	 them	 to	other	organizations.	This	 is	 similar	 to	Thayer,	 who	 argued	 that	 country	 specialists	 “‘bottom	 up’	 view	 directly	 challenges	 key	
assumptions	 of	 international	 and	 regional	 terrorist	 experts.”89	The	 labels,	 sentiments	 and	organisations	used	on	 the	Okonek	case	offers	Twitter	users	a	bottom	up	voice	 to	 reflect	the	 diet	 of	 the	ASG	 coverage	 consumed.	 The	 natural	 conclusion	 is	 that	 the	 international	
Islamist	dimension	is	not	shared	from	‘the	bottom’.	
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